Misperception of Consumption: Evidence from a Choice Experiment by Jung, Seeun et al.
Misperception of Consumption: Evidence from a Choice
Experiment
Seeun Jung, Yasuhiro Nakamoto, Masayuki Sato, Katsunori Yamada
To cite this version:
Seeun Jung, Yasuhiro Nakamoto, Masayuki Sato, Katsunori Yamada. Misperception of Con-
sumption: Evidence from a Choice Experiment. PSEWorking Papers n2014-14. 2014. <halshs-
00965671>
HAL Id: halshs-00965671
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00965671
Submitted on 25 Mar 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER N° 2014 – 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Misperception of Consumption: Evidence from a Choice 
Experiment 
 
Seeun Jung 
Yasuhiro Nakamoto 
Masayuki Sato 
Katsunori Yamada 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes:  
 
Keywords: Relative Utility; Choice Experiment; Misperception of Economic Terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TÉL. : 33(0) 1 43 13 63 00 – FAX : 33 (0) 1 43 13 63 10 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE DES PONTS PARISTECH – ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE – INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE AGRONOMIQU 
Misperception of Consumption: Evidence
from a Choice Experiment
Seeun Jung∗, Yasuhiro Nakamoto†,
Masayuki Sato‡ and Katsunori Yamada§
Abstract
We investigate people’s different conceptions of the economic term “consump-
tion” when comparing with others. An Internet-based hypothetical discrete choice
experiment was conducted with Japanese participants. As in other relative income
comparison studies, we found that own consumption and own saving had a positive
impact on utility, whereas the consumption and saving of a reference person had
a negative impact on utility. However, the results show that the magnitudes of
consumption and saving differ in size; saving could affect utility much more than
consumption for the Japanese subjects. By using scope tests, we found that the
impact of own consumption is not monotonic and so does not necessarily increase
utility. This calls into question the conventional assumption of the monotonicity of
“the utility of consumption”; consumption could be perceived as a negative good.
Our results, therefore, provide some evidence that, in reality, people understand
and perceive the economic terms differently from what economists would expect.
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Furthermore, when considering the consumption of others as well as their own, the
size of the discrepancy is even bigger.
Keywords: Relative Utility; Choice Experiment; Misperception of Economic Terms
1 Introduction
Consumption is obviously a central notion for economics, as it is one of the essential
factors in the optimization of households’ utility functions. In theory, we often take it for
granted that total income is the sum of consumption and saving in the budget constraint.
Therefore, not only theorists but also experimental economists tend to innocuously as-
sume that an increase in consumption would increase utility, as it is well-known that an
increase in income does increase utility (general monotonicity assumption of the utility
function, Layard et al. (2008)). Our interests lie in how individuals allocate their bud-
gets into savings and consumption in a way that maximizes their utilities. Therefore,
unlike other relative income studies, we examine the roles of consumptions and savings
separately.
This paper provides some empirical evidence of different perceptions of consumption
in economic experiments, suggesting that subjects in experiments may have a different
understanding of this important technical term in economics. More specifically, from the
results in our situational choice tasks about allocation of consumption and saving under
a budget constraint, we point out the possibility that consumption could be perceived
as a “bad”, which would decrease the utility of the individuals in the Japanese sample.
This is different from the standard assumption that an increase in consumption would
increase the level of utility.
In this study, we employed a hypothetical discrete choice experiment strategy that
Yamada and Sato (2013) exploited to estimate the direction and intensity of social prefer-
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ences in terms of income comparisons. While Yamada and Sato (2013) provided a variety
of results for income comparisons, there remain open questions. Among these issues,
one important topic is that researchers are not clear about which measures people use
to form comparisons with others. Namely, as Fliessbach et al. (2007) suggested, it may
not be all about income comparisons, but it could also be about consumption or saving
comparisons, for instance.
Our strategy to measure the importance of relative comparison is to ask subjects hy-
pothetical questions regarding their choices between alternative situations, where their
choice reflects their concern for relative positions. In order to investigate in which dimen-
sion people tend to compare themselves to others, we prepared a hypothetical discrete
choice experiment following Johansson-Stenman et al. (2001), Solnick and Hemenway
(1998) and Yamada and Sato (2013) except that, in this study, subjects are asked to
choose from situations defined over sets of consumption and saving, instead of merely
over income levels. In our experiments, the Japanese participants made repeated choices
between alternative societies, described by an imaginary consumption and saving level for
themselves as well as the consumption and saving level of others, which subjects might
use as references to evaluate their own circumstances. For example, in one situation the
subject’s consumption is given as 3 million yen and the saving as 3 million yen, while
the reference person’s consumption is given as 4 million yen and the savings as 4 million
yen. In the alternative situation the participant’s consumption is 2 million yen and the
saving is 2 million yen, but the reference person’s consumption and saving are both 1
million yen. If the participant cares more about absolute terms, he would prefer the first
situation. On the other hand, if he cares about relative terms, he would choose the sec-
ond situation, where he is richer than the reference person. However, as we split income
into consumption and saving, it could be more complicated for a participant to decide
in which situation he would be happier. As long as the budget constraints are satisfied,
conventionally, economists simply assume that the sum of consumption and saving is the
income for the current period so that the distinction between the two components may
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not be very interesting (except for the associated topic of intertemporal choice and time
discounting). However, evidence from our original Internet-based survey showed that
things may not be as simple as economists presume.
The results from our hypothetical choice experiment shows that people usually prefer
situations with higher own consumption and higher own saving, and lower reference
consumption and lower reference saving. If we take this into account in a theoretical model
in which we assume that income is the sum of consumption and saving, this result goes in
the same direction as the relative income comparison literature, which claims that people
become happier when they become richer and become less happy when others become
richer, due to envy (Clark et al. (2008), Alesina et al. (2004), Luttmer (2005), Ferrer-i
Carbonell and Frijters (2004), Clark et al. (2009)). However, the respective impacts of
consumption and saving on utility are found to be very different in terms of magnitude.
While own saving has a large positive impact when choosing between situations, own
consumption seems to have much less of an effect. To discover the rationale behind this
effect, we conducted scope tests using different categories of consumption and saving
levels. The results of these scope tests are very interesting: own consumption does
not monotonically increase utility, whereas the impacts from other factors, such as own
saving, reference consumption and reference saving, remain monotonic. There are two
possible explanations for these puzzling results: (1) the subject may perceive the term
‘consumption’ differently when it comes to themselves, or (2) the term ‘consumption’ is
not correctly interpreted by the respondent.
In the psychological literature, asymmetry in human perception and ratings has been
widely studied. People tend to think differently when it comes to themselves. They think
more subjectively when a topic concerns themselves and objectivity can be more easily
maintained when they judge others. In particular, there is the so-called optimism bias
(Smith and Fontaine (1995 Aug)). For example, people tend to have optimistic expecta-
tions for their own health. Optimism bias could also explain why people tend to overrate
themselves while being accurate when rating others. On average, subjects evaluated their
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performance slightly more positively than either their peers or observers do, which John
and Robins (1994) tried to explain with the term ‘narcissism’. Taylor and Brown (1988)
suggest that overly positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mas-
tery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought. Similarly,
some studies showing that self-ratings are more positive than ratings by uninvolved ob-
servers have been interpreted as evidence of a harshness bias from observers rather than
an enhancement bias toward the self (Coyne and Gotlib (1983)). Our results also pro-
vide evidence of this asymmetrical perception bias when people compare themselves with
others. However, the effect is in the opposite direction: whereas in the optimism bias
literature people tend to be more generous toward themselves, we found that Japanese
subjects tend to be stricter with themselves.
The other possible reason is that in the experiment, the term ‘consumption’ is not
interpreted as economists often assume. Within Japanese social norms, the term ‘con-
sumption’ can be negatively perceived, as the social virtue is to save and be modest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of our
dataset and introduces the choice task, in which respondents make decisions about socio-
economic situations. We also provide a brief description of the features of the random
utility model that we rely on for empirical analyses. Section 3 provides baseline results
from the conditional logit model and additional results from the scope tests. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2 Survey and empirical methods
2.1 Survey
As a pre-test for the work in Yamada and Sato (2013), we took a dataset from an original
web-based survey conducted in March 2009. This survey was conducted by a Japanese
consumer monitoring company and has a total number of registered people of around
990,000. The company distributed the survey to 2,859 people aged between 18 and 69
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who were randomly selected from the population such that the cohort profile mirrored the
Japanese census representative statistics. 1,043 surveys were completed.1 The average
time to finish the survey was 18 minutes 30 seconds. Each respondent who completed
the survey was paid about 800 yen (about 8 US dollars).
The descriptive statistics of the sample are shown in Table 1. Women account for
around 48%of the sample. The mean age of respondents is 44.9 years, and 66% of people
in the sample are married. Regarding educational attainment, 3%of the sample completed
middle school only, 33%completed high school and 39% pursued more advanced studies.
The remaining 25% of the sample holds other degrees, including those from technical and
2-year college programs. We do not see a big demographic difference between men and
women, except in the case of college and post-doctoral attainments.
2.2 Hypothetical discrete choice question
We begin by explaining the experimental paradigm in the survey. Before the subjects
began responding to repeated choice questions, they were shown an instruction screen
displaying the following (although in Japanese):
Question: Imagine that for a given period of time you can consume and
save certain amounts. In the following figures, pairs of your consumption
and saving as well as those of “some representative person in society” are
presented. Imagine that each set of your consumption-saving profile and
the other’s consumption-saving profile are representative of society’s socio-
economic situation. Which of situation 1 and 2 do you prefer?
In the questions, each situation is defined by four attributes : one’s own saving, one’s
own consumption, the reference saving and the reference consumption. The choice sce-
nario also provided the option “Don’t know / Cannot answer.”2 Section 4 explains how
1For our study we removed observations of respondents who did not provide sufficient information in
answers to questions about their demographic backgrounds.
2We provided this no-choice option because of the suggestion by Arrow et al. (1993) and Haaijer and
Wedel (2001), who pointed out the importance of including a no-choice option in hypothetical choice
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Figure 1: Screenshot of Choice Question
we estimate parameters for a utility function by using observations of discrete choices on
preferred saving and consumption scenarios. Next, we explain how we constructed our
choice questions.
The levels of the four attributes (own saving and own consumption and reference
saving and consumption) were set to one of four values: 1 million JPY, 2 million JPY, 3
million JPY and 4 million JPY. Note that we did not specify a time span in the experiment
because doing so may make the choice tasks less real for some subjects. Instead, given
the levels of attributes, the respondents could adjust the time span for consumption and
saving in accordance with their real lives. In the example shown above, if a subject
is concerned about his own consumption–saving levels and if he inclines to saving, he
will choose Situation 2. He may also choose Situation 2 if he has altruistic preferences.
However, if the subject is jealous or envious of the reference person’s consumption–saving
level, he may choose Situation 1, despite his preferences for his own economic activity,
to prevent the reference person from having the much higher level of saving in Situation
2. Four possible levels for each attribute provide 256 potential variations in the situation
scenario. In the literature, these scenarios are called alternatives.
experiments. We then removed from our regressions those observations in which the no-choice option was
selected. An alternative way of coping with these observations is to interpret them as showing indifference
between the two situations, rather than a failure to understand the survey question. Unfortunately, we
have no information about the true reason why the no-choice option was chosen in individual cases.
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Researchers have to make their own choices about which alternatives to use in survey
questions and which ones to discard. Following Louviere et al. (2000), we conducted
orthogonal planning in choosing the alternatives to be used in choice questions. This
method effectively pairs multi-dimensional and multiple-level attributes in alternatives,
and provides an experimental plan providing the greatest amount of information using
the fewest observations. Further, employing orthogonal planning, we can avoid multi-
collinearity problems in the regressions of the random utility model explained in Sec-
tion 2.3, because the independent variables in the regressions are orthogonal. We used
SPSS Conjoint (ver. 11.0) for the orthogonal design of alternatives in this study.
Next, we constructed choice sets consisting of pairs of alternatives and the no-choice
option. To meet the requirements of orthogonal design, 16 alternatives out of 256 poten-
tial variations had to be used. Thus, we generated two different alternative vectors, each
of which consists of 16 pairs of own saving and own consumption levels and reference
saving and consumption levels. Finally, choice sets, with a no-choice option, are created
by pairing two alternatives, one of which is taken from an alternative vector and the other
of which is chosen from the other alternative vector. Because orthogonality of the alter-
native matrix is maintained under row permutations, we can arbitrarily pair alternatives.
Thus, the pairing strategy is at the discretion of the researchers, but all the variations
must be chosen and the same alternative cannot be used twice. As documented in Huber
and Zwerina (1996) and Viscusi et al. (2008), it is ideal if the choice design can be paired
so as to balance the utility of each alternative. Finally, we avoided dominant options or
easy choices. With all these devices, we could efficiently obtain parameter estimates.
Each respondent answered eight randomly assigned questions out of the 16 total
questions given in the following table.3 We removed observations in which the no-choice
option (3) was selected, leaving us with 6,872 observations out of the total 8,344 (82.3%).
3Every number is millions of JPY. OC = Own Consumption; OS = Own Saving; RC = Reference
consumption; RS = Reference Saving.
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Situation 1 Situation 2
SC SS OC OS SC SS OC OS
Q1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2
Q2 1 2 2 4 1 1 1 1
Q3 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 4
Q4 2 2 1 2 4 1 4 4
Q5 1 3 3 2 2 2 4 3
Q6 3 1 3 4 1 4 2 3
Q7 1 4 4 3 3 1 3 3
Q8 4 1 4 2 1 3 4 2
Q9 3 2 4 1 3 3 2 4
Q10 2 3 4 4 3 2 1 2
Q11 3 3 1 3 3 4 4 1
Q12 4 3 2 1 4 4 3 2
Q13 4 4 1 4 4 3 1 3
Q14 2 4 3 1 4 2 2 1
Q15 3 4 2 2 2 4 1 4
Q16 4 2 3 3 2 3 3 1
2.3 Random utility model and empirical method
In this section, we introduce the econometric foundation for how subjects’ choice data can
be used to estimate their utility functions.4 We start by describing a discrete choice model
with a general utility function. To analyze decisions in hypothetical choice experiments,
we use a random utility model framework. The model deals with data on repeated choices
over available alternatives. It is assumed that subjects choose an alternative because they
obtain a higher utility from that alternative than from the other available alternatives.
When there are two alternatives available (A and B, for example), and if they chose A
rather than B, then the choice data is recorded as 1 for alternative A and 0 for alternative
B, along with the levels of the explanatory variables (attributes) in alternatives A and B,
respectively. These pieces of information comprise the observation for regression analyses.
Now, more specifically, suppose there are N subjects and they answer T (≥ 1) repeated
choice questions. The utility of subject n when s/he chooses alternative i at question
t ∈ T , Uitn, consists of experimentally observable components Vitn and unobservable
components ǫitn so that utility can be viewed as Uitn = Vitn+ǫitn. Utilities from observable
components are assumed to be linear combinations of each attribute: Vitn =
∑K
k=1 βkXik,
where k = 1, · · · , K(K ≥ 2) indexes the attributes, Xk denotes the levels of the kth
4This section repeats the discussion in Yamada and Sato (2013).
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attribute and βk measures the marginal utility of each attribute. In the following analysis,
the vector β ≡ (β1, · · · , βK) that maximizes the log likelihood function of observed choice
patterns by a subject is the estimator of conditional logit model regressions. Following
McFadden (1974), ǫitn follow independent and identical distributions of extreme value
type 1 (IIDEV1) with variance σ2.
The logit formula of the probability Pitn that subject n chooses alternative i from the
set of alternatives St (choice set) in question t ∈ T can be written as
Pitn = Prob(Uitn > Ujtn, ∀j 6= i ∈ St) = Prob(ǫjtn − ǫitn < Vitn − Vjtn, ∀j 6= i ∈ St).
McFadden (1974) showed that Pitn = exp(λVitn)/
∑
j∈S exp(λVjtn), where λ = π/
√
6σ is
the scale parameter.
Finally, a dummy variable ditn is defined, taking a value of 1 if subject n choose
alternative i for question t ∈ T , and 0 otherwise. Together with the logit formula of choice
probability Pitn, the log likelihood function of repeated choices observed in experiments
can be written as
LL(β) =
∑
n
∑
t
∑
i∈St
ditn lnPitn.
In the conditional logit model, the parameters of utility function, β, can be obtained
from the first-order conditions ∂LL(β)/∂βk = 0 (McFadden 1974). To be more specific,
when we estimate the model parameters assuming that the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) holds, we obtain a conditional logit model where all of N subjects share
the same set of parameters in β.
Next, we specify the shape of the utility function for our own purposes. Individuals
derive utility not only from their own consumption X1 = c and saving X2 = s, but also
from the socially representative consumption X3 = C and saving X4 = S. We use the
following utility function in which each component is described by an exponential form:
U = cαsβCχSψ, (1)
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where α, β, χ and ψ are parameters.5 We presume that α and β are positive. We do not
impose restrictions on χ and ψ a priori, because they are regulated by social norms. If
their signs are positive, then the social norm of social comparison will be of admiration
or cooperation as a result of altruism, egalitarianism (Fehr et al. (2008), Bartling et al.
(2009)) or of the influence of public goods to which others contribute with taxes; if they
are negative, the social norm of envy or rivalry dominates admiration or altruism.
Again, let i denote the alternative and n denote the subject. We take the logarithms
of both sides in Equation 1 to obtain
lnVni = α ln cin + β ln sin + χ lnCin + ψ lnSin. (2)
With an error term ǫn, the probability Pin that respondent n prefers alternative i to
alternative j is given by
Pin = Prob
(
α ln cin + β ln sin + χ lnCin + ψ lnSin + ǫin
> α ln cjn + β ln sjn + χ lnCjn + ψ lnSjn + ǫjn
)
, for all j 6= i.
Using maximum-likelihood estimation we obtain coefficients β1 = αˆ and so forth. These
estimates are regarded as marginal utilities in the random utility model framework.
3 Empirical results
Results from the conditional logit model are shown in Column (1) in Table 2. We see that
both own consumption and own saving affect utility positively and significantly. These
results confirm the textbook assumptions, and validate the structure of our questionnaire.
In contrast, the effects of reference consumption and saving on utility are estimated to
be significantly negative. This result of social preference in the form of envy is the same
5It is also possible to address the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type of utility function. The
implications obtained below remain unchanged.
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as that found in Yamada and Sato (2013) who used similar Internet-based choice survey
data and found ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ effects associated with income. All of the
above effects are significant at the 5% level, and are as expected. Hence, the dominating
social norm of pecuniary comparison in the Japanese economy will not be admiration but
envy. This finding is in line with the relative income comparison and happiness literature.
Next, we examined the different impacts of interaction with being female, being rich,
having high education, urban living and being young.6 We found that women tend to
be less happy than men when own consumption increases. Rich people tend to be more
sensitive to reference consumption and feel unhappy when it increases. Also, young people
are more envious about reference saving.
There are, however, some reasons for caution. From Table 2 we can see that the
effect on utility of saving is dominant over that of consumption. In fact, the ratio of
the elasticity of the utility of own consumption to that of own saving is equal to 0.186.
The same dominating role of saving can be found with respect to a rival’s consumption
and saving levels. This inclination toward saving as a determinant of utility may be
derived from the fact that the survey was conducted in the midst of the recent financial
recession in 2009. The severe market conditions might have induced in subjects a mood
of refraining from consumption so that they increase saving in readiness for uncertain
future economic situations.7 But Japan is well-known for its high saving rate. This may
represent the Japanese social norm: abstaining from consumption and saving more could
be considered as resulting from the social virtues of modesty and self-control, as well as
the preparation for the uncertain events in the future (Lebra (1976), Baba (1996),and
Shimizu and LeVine (2001)). In this social environment, people might be happier when
they can save more than when they can spend more. However, this possible Japan-specific
reason is not tested in our study. Instead, we try to investigate whether (or not) different
ways of perceiving saving and consumption exist in reality by using scope tests.
6Columns (2) - (6), respectively.
7However, given the fact that the saving rate for Japan is around 20%, it is rather difficult to ascribe
the bias toward saving just to precautionary saving motives during the recession.
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Given that the estimate for own consumption shown in Table 2 seems too small in
comparison with own saving to validate the current saving behavior in Japan, we suspect
that our subjects did not perceive the term ‘consumption’ in the way economists normally
suppose or that they have their own way of weighting consumption and saving allocations
in terms of utility. Hence, following Heberlein et al. (2005) we tried scope tests to see
if the increase in consumption actually provides a monotonic increase in utility to the
subjects.8 Table 3 shows the results of the scope tests. First of all, in Column (1),
with respect to Own Saving terms, estimates for higher saving levels (omitted category
is Own Saving 1) indicate that as the saving level increases, one obtains higher utility.
This is as expected by the conventional theory. It is similar for the reference saving. An
increase in reference saving would gradually decrease subjects’ utility. What is puzzling is
the behavior of consumption. An increase in reference consumption decreases a subject’s
utility as expected, but with lower significance. Own Consumption is even more puzzling.
Estimates for dummies related to Own Consumption 2-4 (here, the omitted category is the
lowest level of consumption; Own Consumption 1) are very small and even negative. This
observation differs from textbook assumptions that the marginal utility of consumption
is always positive (monotonicity) and could indicate that the conventional definition of
‘consumption’ is not well understood by subjects compared to the term ‘saving’. The
results remain similar when we allow for interactions in Columns (2)-(6). However, it
should be noted that none of the Own Consumption coefficients are significantly different
from zero, so the hypothesis of monotonicity cannot be rejected statistically.
There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. One possibility is the
“moral purchase property” suggested by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992). In this survey,
subjects were found to try to exhibit humbleness. As explained above, under Japanese
social norms, spending less and saving more do represent higher social virtues in society.
Thus, while people could still envy another’s ability to consume more, when it comes to
8The scope tests use dummies for each input of own saving, own consumption, reference saving and
reference consumption. Our alternatives for different situations vary over 4 different amounts: 1, 2, 3
and 4 million yen. We treat each amount as a dummy variable, with the reference amount 1 million yen.
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themselves, their feelings toward consumption might be a little bit more complex. This
virtue of abstinence from consumption can be also found in some religions or philosophies,
such as Buddhism and Confucianism, which are also locally found in Japanese society.
This idea could well explain the first positive and significant sign of the consumption
effect, which we could set up as the basic reference point. Then, when people think
consumption exceeds their basic needs (above the reference point, category 2-4), it does
not increase their happiness any longer.
One other possibility is subjects’ misperception of the technical term ‘consumption’.
Total consumption consists of various types of consumption in reality and, as DeLeire
and Kalil (2010) showed in the literature of happiness economics, it is possible that only
specific types of consumption can increase the welfare of subjects and that the other
types of consumption are taken as negatives instead; in general, only one component of
consumption is positively related to happiness — leisure consumption. Moreover, the
term ‘consumption’ might confuse a subject with two different perspectives. One is the
consumption that is often found in economics, which is just the part of income increasing
the utility monotonically, whereas the other is related to expenditure. Subjects might
perceive consumption not only as their capability to spend and richness to show off, but
also as the expenditure that they must make, with the lack of choice driving the negative
feeling toward it. However, the tricky part is that the rival’s status in the experiment
does not coincide with this explanation.
The effects of the status of others on utility were estimated as follows. We can see
that when the reference consumption level is very large, people feel jealous; this can
be seen from the estimate of Reference Consumption 4. While the effects of Reference
Consumption 2 and Reference Consumption 3 are not significant, the sign is in the right
direction. This means that the relative utility gained by the reference consumption and
saving is consistent with monotonicity. The estimates of Reference Saving 3 and Reference
Saving 4 seem to be acceptable, but the magnitudes of the point estimates are reversed.
Note, however, that there is an overlap for those two estimates in the 95% confidence
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intervals (not shown).
From this result, we can see that people perceive the term ‘consumption’ differently
when it comes to themselves and others: they have more mixed and complex feelings
toward the term when applied to themselves, while they take it with simple envy in the
case of others. This could be explained by the self-perception bias in psychology which
is supported by empirical evidence that people tend to think differently when it comes
to themselves. Our result also supports that idea. Yet, one finding of our study differs
from the literature: while in the literature, people are optimistic in terms of self-rating
or expectation (optimism bias), in our study, Japanese people are found to be harsher on
their own consumption.9
Table 4 presents the within and between comparison. In this analysis, we treat the
data as a panel, taking the repeated choices as periods. Each subject has 8 periods of
time. In this setting, we are able to compare the difference choices across time as well
as across individuals. The first two columns allow dummies for the comparison between
the current situation at t and the previous situation at t− 1. Individuals may remember
historical situations, and tend to compare the current situation with the past. Clark
(1999) suggested that employees would compare their current pay with their past pay,
and found that job satisfaction is strongly correlated with the change in pay. In our
setting, we follow the order of 8 repeated situations. We add dummies for (1) choosing
a smaller current own consumption than past own consumption 1OCt<OC∗t−1 , and (2)
choosing a smaller current own saving than the past own saving (1OSt>OS∗t−1). If the
current given situations for own saving are smaller than the past own saving chosen,
subjects tend to decrease their utility level significantly. However, for consumption, the
estimate is positive, though it is not statistically significant. Here again, it shows that
an increase in own consumption does not necessarily increase the utility level.
In Column (2), we show the estimates for between comparisons. We add dummies for
(1) smaller own consumption level given in the situation compared to others(1OCt<RCt),
9This could be explained by the Japanese social norm, as we described above. Also, Xie et al. (2006)
investigated cultural differences in terms of self-perception bias.
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and (2) smaller own saving level given in the situation compared to others (1OSt<RSt).
This analysis is to allow different marginal impacts when the subject is richer or poorer
than others, and therefore capture the ‘envy’ factor. The amount by which one increases
his happiness when he is richer than others may not be the same as the one by which
he decreases his happiness when he poorer than others. Subjects tend to decrease their
utility level when the choice sets give lower levels of both own consumption and own
saving in comparison to those of others. However, if we look at the main estimates for
own consumption and reference consumption, the result is interesting. The coefficient of
own consumption is no longer significant, and the coefficient of reference consumption
become strongly positive. Basically, subjects care more for reference consumption than
own consumption level. If subjects’ consumption levels are lower than those of others,
then subjects decrease their utility level. Here, indeed, the result shows the mixed effect of
perceived ‘consumption’. Consumption per se contributes negatively to the utility level.
Yet, a direct comparison between yourself and others switches the effect of perceived
‘consumption’.
With our results, we re-validate the relative income comparison literature: (1) individ-
uals compare their own consumption and saving with those of others, and (2) a person’s
utility level is positively correlated with their own consumption and saving while being
negatively correlated with reference consumption and saving. But the term ‘consumption’
is not always perceived in the same way as saving (and, therefore, potential ‘income’ in
general) for the Japanese subjects, showing a possible negative relationship with utility.
These results call into question the general assumption that consumption has the same
effects as income in terms of the utility level, as the Japanese subjects tend to perceive
the term ‘consumption’ rather negatively.
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4 Conclusions
The economic assumption of monotonicity of consumption on utility has been taken for
granted without validation in the empirical analyses of various studies. Moreover, often we
believe that economic terms will be perceived in the same way no matter whether they are
associated with oneself or others. However, the real situation might be more complicated
than we have assumed. While others’ consumption could be seen as representing others’
richness and as a reflection of their income, a person’s attitude to their own consumption
could be more complicated and have mixed effects. That is, consumption may have (1) a
positive effect as a part of income, and (2) a negative effect as expenditure that you have
make, or because of feelings of guilt for over-consuming due to the specifically Japanese
social norm of being modest. This suggests the possibility that consumption may be seen
as a negative good in individual perceptions.
In our study, we investigated whether these assumptions hold in reality by conducting
a hypothetical choice experiment, which explored how individuals allocate their given
income to consumption and saving in order to maximize their utilities.
Our major findings can be summarized as follows. In accordance with the theory that
utility is determined also by relative income, not only by absolute income (Alpizar et al.
(2005)), our results show that my consumption and saving can increase my utility, whereas
others’ consumption and saving might decrease my utility. However, this interpretation
is based on the assumption that the income is the sum of saving and consumption. When
we look at the size of the impacts on saving and consumption, the magnitude of the
effect of saving is much larger than that of consumption. To figure out the reason for this
in more detail, we conducted scope tests and found indications that the impact of own
consumption is not monotonic in the consumption level. That means an increase in own
consumption does not necessarily increase utility. This calls into question the general
assumption of the monotonicity of the utility function and also gives a hint that people
may not think that income is the simple sum of consumption and saving. Our results
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could, therefore, provide some evidence that, in reality, people understand and perceive
economic terms differently from what economists would expect, and when considering
the consumption of others as well as their own the size of the discrepancy is even bigger.
There are two possible explanations for this puzzling result. One is the possible existence
of self-perception bias which could explain the different ways of thinking about oneself
and others. The other is the negative connotation of the term ‘consumption’ for a society
in which saving is a great virtue and, therefore, people feel guilty about their purchasing
habits.
The final thing that this paper suggests is that we need to examine carefully how
best to interpret the responses of subjects when using survey data or experimental data.
Terms that people use and see could be understood in a very different way from what we
economists want to measure.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Whole sample Male Female
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Variable
Female [0,1] 0.48 0.50
Age in years 44.86 14.62 44.69 14.33 45.04 14.95
Middle School [0,1] 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17
High School [0,1] 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48
College/ Post Grad [0,1] 0.39 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.27 0.45
Married [0,1] 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.66 0.48
N 1043 547 496
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Table 2: Determinant of Choice related to Own Situation and Others’ Situation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Consumption 0.377*** 0.572*** 0.347** 0.279* 0.381*** 0.373**
(3.81) (4.33) (3.17) (2.19) (3.35) (2.94)
Own Saving 2.023*** 1.901*** 2.016*** 1.994*** 1.920*** 1.954***
(19.11) (13.70) (17.19) (14.37) (15.82) (14.47)
Reference Consumption -0.110** -0.085 -0.066 -0.138** -0.090* -0.158**
(-2.77) (-1.61) (-1.51) (-2.67) (-1.97) (-3.07)
Reference Saving -0.438*** -0.404*** -0.437*** -0.421*** -0.442*** -0.370***
(-11.01) (-7.63) (-10.00) (-8.24) (-9.62) (-7.25)
Interaction Female Rich High Edu Urban Young
× Self Consumption -0.424* 0.180 0.250 -0.010 0.020
(-2.13) (0.71) (1.24) (-0.05) (0.10)
× Self Saving 0.334 0.057 0.085 0.435 0.182
(1.55) (0.21) (0.40) (1.76) (0.83)
× Reference Consumption -0.065 -0.253* 0.069 -0.083 0.126
(-0.81) (-2.36) (0.85) (-0.90) (1.55)
× Reference Saving -0.087 -0.006 -0.046 0.009 -0.178*
(-1.08) (-0.06) (-0.56) (0.10) (-2.18)
Observation 13744 13744 13744 13744 13744 13744
BIC 7854.522 7835.134 7885.425 7887.474 7877.881 7881.889
AIC 7824.408 7774.907 7825.198 7827.247 7817.654 7821.662
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance level.
Notes: Conditional logit estimation, grouped by choice sets. Robust Standard Error.
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Table 3: Scope Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Consumption (Ref = 100)
= 200 -0.103 0.015 -0.127 -0.184 -0.096 -0.116
(-0.43) (0.06) (-0.52) (-0.74) (-0.39) (-0.47)
= 300 0.019 0.214 -0.017 -0.105 0.032 -0.003
(0.05) (0.51) (-0.04) (-0.25) (0.08) (-0.01)
= 400 -0.117 0.116 -0.165 -0.276 -0.100 -0.146
(-0.22) (0.22) (-0.31) (-0.52) (-0.19) (-0.27)
Own Saving (Ref = 100)
= 200 0.776** 0.684** 0.767** 0.739** 0.714** 0.712**
(3.28) (2.81) (3.21) (3.05) (2.98) (2.95)
= 300 1.311** 1.173* 1.297** 1.252** 1.216** 1.212**
(2.86) (2.51) (2.81) (2.69) (2.63) (2.61)
= 400 2.367*** 2.199*** 2.350*** 2.293*** 2.248*** 2.245***
(5.16) (4.65) (5.06) (4.85) (4.83) (4.78)
Reference Consumption (Ref = 100)
= 200 -0.132 -0.122 -0.101 -0.146 -0.122 -0.165
(-0.77) (-0.70) (-0.59) (-0.85) (-0.71) (-0.95)
= 300 -0.064 -0.063 -0.017 -0.088 -0.048 -0.117
(-0.41) (-0.39) (-0.11) (-0.56) (-0.31) (-0.73)
= 400 -0.286** -0.254* -0.221* -0.317** -0.265** -0.357***
(-3.22) (-2.51) (-2.40) (-3.19) (-2.81) (-3.60)
Reference Saving (Ref = 100)
= 200 -0.041 -0.004 -0.038 -0.026 -0.047 0.002
(-0.27) (-0.03) (-0.25) (-0.17) (-0.31) (0.01)
= 300 -0.421*** -0.374*** -0.421*** -0.396*** -0.426*** -0.345***
(-4.32) (-3.57) (-4.23) (-3.84) (-4.24) (-3.33)
= 400 -0.288* -0.238 -0.286* -0.258 -0.300* -0.192
(-2.17) (-1.68) (-2.10) (-1.84) (-2.19) (-1.37)
Interaction X Female Rich High Edu Urban Young
Observation 13744 13744 13744 13744 13744 13744
BIC 7721.108 7705.490 7751.907 7754.327 7745.280 7747.749
AIC 7630.768 7585.037 7631.453 7633.874 7624.826 7627.295
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance level.
Notes: Conditional logit estimation, grouped by choice sets. Robust Standard Error.
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Table 4: Within and Between Comparison
(1) (2)
Own Consumption 0.430*** 0.080
(4.16) (0.62)
Own Saving 1.787*** 2.255***
(17.02) (20.66)
Reference Consumption -0.155*** 0.519***
(-3.48) (6.36)
Reference Saving -0.443*** -0.341***
(-10.93) (-4.33)
Within Comparison
Current Consumption < Previous Consumption Chosen ( = 1 ) 0.015
(0.23)
Current Saving < Previous Saving Chosen ( = 1 ) -0.991***
(-11.75)
Between Comparison
Reference Consumption > OwnConsumption ( = 1 ) -0.788***
(-8.00)
Reference Saving > Own Saving ( = 1 ) -0.348***
(-3.30)
Observations 13744 13744
BIC 7793.233 7869.220
AIC 7748.063 7824.049
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance level.
Notes: Conditional logit estimation, grouped by choice sets. Robust Standard Error.
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